The paper studies the effect of resource abundance on human development. A simple theory is presented to show that resource abundance negatively affects human development through its effect on inequality. The prediction of the theory is then tested using a system of three equations. Estimates indicate that the transmission channel through inequality is statistically significant and economically relevant even after controlling for per-capita income, institutional quality, and other determinants of both human development and inequality. Abstract The paper studies the e¤ect of resource abundance on human development. A simple theory is presented to show that resource abundance negatively a¤ects human development through its e¤ect on inequality. The prediction of the theory is then tested using a system of three equations. Estimates indicate that the transmission channel through inequality is statistically signi…cant and economically relevant even after controlling for per-capita income, institutional quality, and other determinants of both human development and inequality.
Introduction
This paper documents the adverse e¤ect that resource abundance has on human development through the dynamics of income inequality. In a simple theoretical model, capitalists allocate their wealth between resource-seeking and physical capital investment. A resource boom implies that less wealth is allocated to investment. This in turn reduces the marginal productivity of labour and drives the wage of workers in the productive sector down, while the rents of capitalists increase. Growing inequalities between capitalists and workers have an ambiguous e¤ect on average per-capita income in the economy. However, a mean-preserving increase in income inequality unambiguously worsens human development, which is formally de…ned as a concave function of individual income. The econometric analysis tests the predictions of the theoretical model within the framework of a system of three equations. Estimates suggest that (i) resource abundance increases inequality after controlling for per-capita income, (ii) higher inequality reduces the average level of human development in the population, and (iii) resource abundance worsens institutional quality, but the e¤ect of institutional quality on human development is not always signi…cant once per-capita income and income inequality are controlled for.
The conventional wisdom holds that resource abundance is bad for economic growth. Gylfason et al. (1999) , Gylfason (2001a) and Warner (1999 and 2001 ) document a statistically signi…cant inverse relationship between the size of the resource sector and economic growth in large cross-sections of countries. Work by Leite and Weidmann (1999) , Ross (2001) , Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) , Isham et al. (2005) indicates that a large natural resource sector lowers the quality of governance and weakens state's capacity to deliver dynamically e¢ cient policies. This negative institutional e¤ect then results in slower growth.
Recent research provides some interesting challanges to the conventional wisdom. Stijns (2005) , Gylfason and Zoega (2006) , Brunnschweiler (2008) , Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) , and Alexeev and Conrad (2009) emphasize that empirical results are sensitive to the way in which natural resources are measured. Earlier papers typically employed the GDP share of the primary commodity sector and/or the total exports share of primary commodity exports as empirical proxies for resource abundance. However, these are indicators of resource dependence, rather than abundance, and they are likely to be endogenous with the dependent variable in income or growth regressions. When more speci…c measures of resource abundance, based on the estimated stock of natural capital and mineral assets per individual (see below for further discussion), are used, then results are reversed and resources are found to be positive for growth and, possibly, for institutional development as well.
A related strand of research argues that resources are not good or bad per se, but that their e¤ects depend on some underlying structural conditions. In this sense, the …ndings reported by Gylfason (2001b) , Mehlum et al. (2006), and Snyder (2006) suggest that what seems to matter for economic growth is the quality of resource management and of economic management and institutions in general. Hodler (2006) develops a theoretical model where resources are a curse only in ethnically fractionalised countries, while they are a blessing in homogenous countries. He then provides empirical evidence in support of this theoretical prediction. Collier and Hoe-er (2009) …nd that democratization of resource-rich countries can reduce growth unless the democratic process involves stronger checks and balances in policymaking. Finally, in Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) the e¤ect of resource abundance on the quality of governance (i.e. the level of corruption) is conditional on the strength of democratic institutions.
While there is a voluminous literature on the growth and institutional e¤ects of natural resources, only a few papers look at the impact of resource abundance on other aspects of the development process. Bulte et al. (2005) study the e¤ect of resource intensity on di¤erent measures of human welfare. They conclude that any signi…cant e¤ect operates indirectly through institutional quality. Costantini and Monni (2008) analyse the interrelations between growth, institutional quality, human development, and resource . They …nd that more abundant natural resource endowments cause worse development outcomes by lowering the growth rate of the economy and by worsening the average quality of institutions. Gylfason (2008) discusses crowding out e¤ects between natural capital and social capital, thus providing evidence of an adverse e¤ect of natural resources on social development.
The purpose of this paper is to better understand the e¤ects of natural resources on human development, whereby human development is de…ned by a combination of di¤erent social outcomes. This seems to be an important issue in view of the growing interest of the international community towards nonincome dimensions of development. Given the state of the art in the literature, the analysis will investigate whether or not natural resources a¤ect development beyond any e¤ect they might have on per-capita income and institutional quality. In so doing, the paper considers a channel of transmission that previous literature has neglected: income inequality. In fact, the idea that natural resources cause inequality is not new (see Gylfason and Zoega, 2003) . What is new is the theoretical and empirical investigation of how this inequality e¤ect matters for human development. In other words, the paper argues, and demonstrates, that even if resources did not adversely a¤ect per-capita income and institutional quality, their e¤ect on inequality would still produce what can be regarded as a development curse.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical argument. Section 3 introduces the empirical analysis, with speci…ca attention to the issue of measuring resource abundance and instrumenting endogenous variables. Results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains some proofs, statistical diagnostics, and the description of variables and data sources. 1 The medical literature on the e¤ects of income inequality on population helath is also relevant to the topic of this paper. Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) conduct a meta-analysis of published work and conclude that, while the issue is still controversial, about 70% of the papers they surveyed suggest that health is less good in societies where income di¤erences are bigger.
A simple theory
To provide some theoretical fundations to the econometric analysis, a simple two-sector model is presented in this section.
The economy
The economy consists of two sectors: natural reosurce and …nal good. In the natural resource sector, individuals make an initial investment and employ some search technology in order to appropriate (i.e. discover) new bundles of resources. Let r be the value of the resources discovered by a generic individual and s her initial investment. Then r s is the resource rent and it is expressed as follows:
where 0 and f 0 (s) > 0 and f 00 (s) < 0 The intution underlying (1) is that discovering new bundles is a stochastic process (very much in line with the formalization of Gylfason and Zoega, 2003) . How many bundles, and of which value, are discovered will depend on (i) the initial investment in the search process, (ii) the producitivity of the search technology, and (iii) country's endowment of natural resources. The e¤ect of initial investment and search technology are captured by the term f (s). The assumptions concerning the sign of the …rst and second derivative of the f function imply that investment in the resource sector is characterized by diminishing marginal products. The parameter instead captures the e¤ect of country's endowment. Intuitively, if a country has no resources to start with, or if its resources have no market value, so that = 0, then an individual can invest all of her wealth and emply the best possible search technology and still her rent will be zero simply because there are no resources to discover and appropriate. Conversely, if the country is well endowed with valuable natural resources, and hence is large, then the number of bundles discovered for any given investment and technology is higher and the rent will also be higher.
In the …nal good sector, a large number of perfectly competitive …rms produce a homogenous good that can be consumed or invested. The production function of the generic …rm i is a Cobb-Douglas with labour augmenting technological progress:
where Y denotes …rm's output, L and K are …rm's inputs of labour and capital, A is the aggregate stock of ideas, and 0 < < 1:
Following Romer (1986) , learning-by-doing and perfect knowledge spillovers imply that A = P i K i = K . The aggregate production function is then obtained by aggregating equation (2) over all is:
In the absence of population growth, equation (3) belongs with the class of AK production functions.
The eocnomy is populated by individuals of two types: capitalists (P ) and workers (W ). There are no demographic dynamics, meaning that the number of both capitalists and workers is constant and the ratio of capitalists to workers is equal to v, with v < 1. The generic individual in each group lives for two periods. In the …rst period she earns an income a, either by working or by investing. In the second period she spends all of her income to consume the homogenous good produced by the competitive …rms. Through consumption, the individual achieves a given level of human development h. The relationship between human development and consumption is given by:
where h j denotes the level of human development of an individual of type j (j = P; W ), c j is consumption of the individual of type j, and 0 < < 1.
To simplify the discussion, it will be assumed that one unit of the income earned in period 1 buys one unit of consumption in period 2, so that in the end human development in the second period is a concave function of the income earned in the …rst period. The objective of the individuals is therefore to maximise …rst period earnings as this will imply the highest possible level of human development in the second period.
The representative capitalist is initially endowed with one divisible unit of wealth. This unit of wealth can be invested in the discovery of new resources or rented to …rms as physical capital. The representative worker is endowed with one unit of labour that she inelastically supplies to the perfectly competitive …rms in the …nal good sector. If workers cannot borrow against their future labour income, then they cannot a¤ord the initial investment in the natural resource sector. Therefore, only capitalists populate the natural resource sector.
Allocative choices and equilibrium
This subsection studies the equilibrium choices of the representative individuals and how these choices are a¤ected by changes in country's resource endowment : The function f (s) in equation (1) is assumed to take the form s , with 0 < < 1. The resource rent earned by the capitalist is therefore:
It is worth stressing that s represents the proportion of initial wealth that the capitalists allocates to the discovery of natural resources. Therefore, s < 1 and s is decreasing in :
2 In this sense, lower values of denote a more e¢ cient 2 The margina product of s is instead a non-linear function of and has a maximum at = 1 ln (s) technology; that is, a technology that allows to earn higher rents for any given s and .
Letting denote the rental price of physical capital, the maximization problem of the representative capitalist is :
subject to (5) and to the …rst order condition for the maximization of …rm's pro…t = L 1 . For 0 < < , the problem has an internal solution given by 3 :
Equation (7) then implies that the income earned by the representative capitalist in equilibrium is:
Equation (7) suggests that the proportion of wealth allocated by the capitalist to the resource sector is higher the more resource abundant the country is. Moreover, from equation (8) it can be seen that
is strictly positive, meaning that the capitalist earns a higher income the more resource abundant the country is. It is also worth stressing the that capitalist's income in equilibrium declines as grows; that is, a less e¢ cient search technology reduces the earnings of the capitalist for any given level of country's resource abundance.
The representative worker does not have much of a choice in this model. She can only supply her unit of labour to …rms in the …nal good sector and earn a the market clearing wage. Her income in the …rst period is therefore:
The stock of physical capital K is determined by the allocative decision of the capitalists. Letting N be the total number of capitalists in the economy, equation (7) implies:
Given that L is equal to the number of workers and that the ratio of capitalists to workers is assumed to be constant and equal to , then N=L = v and equation (10) can substituted into equation (9) to obtain:
Equation (11) has a very intuitive meaning: workers earn a lower income in resource-richer countries. This is because of the crowding-out e¤ect between the natural resource sector and the …nal good sector. In resource-richer economies, the capitalist invests more of her initial wealth in searching for new bundles, thus leaving less wealth available for investment in physical capital. In turn, a lower level of physical capital reduces the marginal producitivity of labour in the …nal good sector and therefore results in a lower market clearing wage. Formally,
, comparison between equation (8) and equation (11) immediately reveals that a P is always larger than a W and that the gap between the income of the two representative individuals widens as grows. This is obvious since the derivatives @a P @ and @a W @ are of opposite sign. Under the assumption that the relative size of the two groups of workers is constant, both the standard deviation of per-capita incomes around the mean and the Gini coe¢ cient are proportional to the gap between a P and a W :This implies that income inequality is higher the more resource abundant the country is.
Closure
Average human development, _ h, and average income, _ a, are formally equal to:
The e¤ect of resource abundance is therefore captured by the derivatives
As shown in the Appendix, neither of the two can be signed with certainty. However:
Proposition 2 The likelihood of
@ being negative is higher the wider the gap between a P and a W .
Proof. See Appendix.
These two simple propositions summarize the theoretical e¤ect of country's resource abundance on average human development and average income. Of particular interest for empirical purposes is proposition 1. This proposition implies that an increase in that leaves _ a unchanged unambigously reduces _ h. That is, holding per-capita income constant, higher resource abundance reduces average human development by raising income inequality in the economy. The intuition underlying this result is that as natural resources crowd out the …nal good sector, capitalists receive a higher income and therefore improve their human development while the opposite happens with workers. However, because of the concavity in the relationship between human development and income, the increase in human development of the capitalits is relatively weaker than the decrease in human development of the workers. Average human development is therefore reduced for any increase in resource abundance that preserves mean income. In fact, proposition 2 suggests that even without holding mean income constant, a wider gap between income of capitalists and income of workers is likely to determine an overall decrease in average human development in response to an increase in resource abundance.
3 Empirical model and data
Speci…cation and estimation method
The prediction of the theoretical model is that resource abundance lowers human development, after controlling for the level of per-capita income, through its e¤ect on the inequality of income distribution in the economy. The empirical test of this prediction involves the estimation of two structural relations:
Human_devolpment c;t = 0 + 1 Inequality c;t + KW c;t + it
where Z and W are vectors of controls, c denotes a generic country, t is time, " and are error terms, and s, s, H, and K are the parameters to be estimated.
Equation (14) captures the inequality e¤ect of resource abundance while equation (15) accounts for the transmission channel of the e¤ect of natural resources on human development through the dynamics of inequality. Based on the theoretical model, the expectation is that 1 > 0 and 1 > 0.
In order to allow for possible correlation in the residuals across equations, and hence achieve some gain in e¢ ciency, the two equations should be estimated together as a system. However, system estimation is not immune from shortcomings. In particular, if one of the equations were misspeci…ed, then the estimates of the other equation would be a¤ected too. The practical solution to this stalmate is to estimate …rst the two equations individually, using standard two stage least squares (2SLS) to account for the possible endogeneity of some of the regressors. Then, the equations are jointly estimated as a system using a GMM estimator. System and single equation estimates can thus be compared in order to detect any signi…cant di¤erences in the results. 
Choice of variables
Income inequality is measured by the Gini index. Resource abundance is measured by the log of subsoil assets in US$ per capita, using data provided by World Bank (1997) . This choice is in line with the most recent literature (see for instance Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008 and Alexeev and Conrad, 2009 ) and addresses some of the shortcomings associated with the traditional approach of measuring dependence as the GDP or total exports share of primary commodity exports (see Warner, 1999 and 2001) . Subsoil wealth rather than total natural capital (which would include land, forests, and timber resources in additional to subsoil assets) is used because it appears to be closer to the notion of resource abundance portrayed in the theoretical model. In fact, one should note that the correlation between subsoil assets and total natural capital is high (0.55) and statistically signi…cant at the 1% con…dence level.
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The main limitation of the subsoil assets data is that they are not available on a time-series dimension and therefore, in a panel regression, they work as timeinvariant country-speci…c e¤ect. For this reason, other recent papers (i.e. Collier and Hoe-er, 2008 and Bhattacharyya and Holder, 2010) employ the adjusted net savings dataset described by Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and available through the World Bank Development Indicators. Once again, correlations between these data and subsoil assets data are very high (around 0.4) and signi…cant. All of the regressions reported in the next subsection have been reestimated using the adjust net savings dataset and results appear to be robust.
The empirical measurement of human development is also a controversial issue. Previous literature makes use of several dissagregate indicators of social outcomes (i.e. child mortatlity rate, primary or secondary enrollment rate, life expectancy, etc...). However, if one is interested in the joint evolution of di¤er-ent development dimensions, then some sort of aggregate measure ought to be employed. Constantini and Monni (2008) for instance use the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1990), which however is obtained from an arbitrary choice of weights in the aggregation of the individual components.
In this paper, human development is de…ned as the …rst princinpal component of life expectancy at birth, rate of children immunization against diphteria, pertussis, and tetanus, and averge years of education in the population. While principal components guarantees that weights are not chosen ad-hoc, one has to recognize that the selection of the individual components to be included in the aggregate measure is still arbitrary and therefore open to criticism. In defense of this choice it can be said that (i) adding more individual components does not seem to change the dynamics of the aggregate measure by much and (ii) data on life expectancy, immunization rates, and schooling are available for most countries over su¢ ciently long time-series (the same is not necessarily true for other measures of human development).
The vector of controls H includes: the log of per-capita GDP, a measure of institutional quality, and a measure of ethnic fragmentation. The role of per-capita income and institutional quality in determining income inequality is discussed in Carmignani (2009) . Istitutional quality is measured by one minus the ratio of currency in circulation to M2 (see Clague et al. 1999 and Dollar and Kraay, 2004) . This variable measures the extent to which property rights are su¢ ciently secure that individuals are willing to hold liquid assets via …nancial intermediaires. It has at least two relevant advantages over other measures of institutional quality: (i) it is objective and (ii) it is available on an annual basis for many countries.
6 Ethnic fragmentation is likely to matter because it a¤ects public goods provision and redistribution (see for instance Alesina et al. 1999 and 2000) .
The vector K includes log per-capita income and institutional quality, in line with Bulte et al. (2005) . In addition, two country-…xed e¤ects are controlled for: distance from the equator and settler's mortality rate. Distance from the equator is intended as a rough proxy for the incidence of fatal diseases such as malaria and yellow fever. The inclusion of the settler's mortality rate as a regressor instead follows the argument put forward by Glaeser et al. 2004 . They suggest that what European settlers brought to colonies was not just a new institutional setting, but also human capital. They then show that the correlation between educational outcomes and settler's mortality is in fact generally high. Therefore, settler's mortality is likely to be a relevant determinant of human development, when this latter is broadly de…ned to include health and education.
Choice of instruments
A key problem in estimating equations (14) and (15) is that some of the regressors might be endogenous to the dependent variables and therefore need to be instrumented. While subsoil assets is likely to be an exogenous variable (see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008) , per-capita income and institutional quality might be a¤ected by inequality and/or human development. To identify appropriate instruments, one shuld then look at the literature on the long-term determinants of income and institutional quality and see which variables are generally used as controls.
7 One such variables is distance from the equator. However, this can be used as an excluded instrument only in equation (14) as it is already included as a regressor in equation (15). Settler's mortality is a popular instrument for institutional quality, but again it appears as a regressor in equation (15) and therefore it can work as an excluded instrument only in equation (14) . Other excluded instruments to be used in both equations would be desirable in order to increase the number of overidentfying restrictions. Regional dummies and dummies for legal origin can serve this purpose. Indeed, regional e¤ects are often found to be relevant in explaining long-term di¤erences in income levels across countries. Regional dummies might therefore instrument for per-capita GDP. Legal origins are instead identifed as key determinants of institutional quality. Dummy variables for English, Scandinavian, German, and Socialist legal origins are therefore used as instruments for institutional quality.
Furthermore, when the equations are not estimated as a system, the likely endogeneity of inequality and human development in equation (15) should also be addressed through the choice of an instrument for inequality. In fact, the speci…cation of equation (14) immediately suggests using ethnic fragmentation as an instrument for inequality.
All of these instruments are time-invariant and should therefore be predetermined relative to income and institutional quality. The J-test con…rms that the overindifying restrictions implied by the choice of instruments are valid. Measures of goodness of …t of the …rst stage regression in the 2SLS also indicate that the chosen instruments are likely to be relevant. 
Results
The equations are estimated on data for 65 countries for the period 1980-2005. Data are averaged over sub-periods of …ve year so that at most …ve observations per country are available. This implies a total of 325 potential observations. In fact, due to missing data, the panel is unbalanced and the e¤ective number of observations available for estimation is considerably smaller than the potential. Table 1 reports 2SLS estimates of equations (14) and (15). Starting with equation (14), the coe¢ cients in column I indicate that resource abundance increases inequality after controlling for the e¤ect of per-capita GDP. The inequality-reducing e¤ect of institutional quality is in line with previous research (see Carmignani, 2009 ) while the negative coe¢ cient of ethnic fragmentation is in line with the "disguised" redistributive policy hypothesis of Alesina et al. 2000 . The lack of signi…cance of the coe¢ cient of per-capita GDP might be due to multicollinearity between per-capita GDP and institutional quality.
As discussed in the previous section, several di¤erent measures of resource abundance have been used in the literature. When resource dependence is measured by the total natural capital or resource rents measured from the adjusted saving datasets, estimated coe¢ cients are virtually equal to those reported in column I. Some changes are instead observed when a measure of resource dependence (exports of fuels and metals in percent of total merchandise export) replaces the measure of resource abundance. Estimated coe¢ cients in column II show that in this case resources appear to play no role in determining in-equality. However, the resource dependence measure is likely to be endogenous with income inequality.
9 Following Brunnschweiler (2008) , resource dependence is instrumented by two indicators of constitutional arrangements: the type of regime (i.e. presidential, parliamentary, or assembly elected) and the type of electoral rule (proportional vs. majoritarian). The regression with resource dependence treated as an endogenous variable are shown in column III. The inequality-increasing e¤ect of natural resources returns to be signi…cant, but the coe¢ cient of institutional quality is no longer di¤erent from zero.
Turning to equation (15), estimates in column IV indicate that higher inequality worsens human development. Combined with the result that resource abundance increases inequality, this …nding provide support to the theoretical prediction: resource abundance negatively a¤ects human development through its e¤ect on income inequality. Interestingly, estimates also suggest that after controlling for the level of per-capita income, institutional quality does not determine human development. This …nding however changes when the two equations are estimated as a system (see below). Looking at the other controls, settler's mortality is largely insigni…cant while distance from the equator appears to reduce human development. This latter result is counter-intuitive and might be due to the fact that latitude is a poor proxy the incidence of diseases.
The speci…cation presented in column V accounts for the possibility that there is a residual direct e¤ect of resource abundance on human development after controlling for inequality, institutions, and per-capita income. The estimated coe¢ cient of the natural resource variable suggests that this residul e¤ect is signi…cant and has the same sign as the indirect e¤ect operating through inequality. The mechanics of this residual e¤ect should be investigated in future work.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
System estimates are reported in table 2. In general, it appears that estimates are more precise. This gain in e¢ ciency results from the fact that the system estimator allows for non-zero correlations between the error terms of the two equations. The core of the …ndings is con…rmed. In column I, resource abundance is still a signi…cant determinant of inequality. In column II, higher inequality reduces human development and there is again evidence of a significant direct e¤ect of resource abundance. There is however an important new …nding: the coe¢ cient of institutional quality is now signi…cant, even if only at the 10% con…dence level. Therefore, there is evidence of a positive e¤ect of good institutions on human development.
The last three columns of table 2 report estimates from an extended system of equation. In addition to equations (14) and (15), the system now includes an equation for the determinantion of institutional quality: Institutional_quality c;t = $ 0 + $ 1 natural_resources c;t + S c;t + c;t (16) where S is a vector of controls, is the error term, and $s and are the parameters to be estimated.
With equation (16), the empirical model integrates two channels of transmission from resource abundance to human development: the inequality channel theorized in this paper and the institutional channel studied by Bulte et al. (2005) and Costantini and Monni (2008) . The choice of controls for equation (16) draws on La Porta et al. (1999) , but with a major modi…cation: the inclusion of the settler's mortality rate (in line with Acemoglu et al. 2001) . The estimated coe¢ cients of equations (14) and (15) are qualitatively the same as those reported in column II and III. Therefore the key …ndings concerning the role of resource abundance and the transmission via income inequality survive. The coe¢ cients reported in column V however indicate that resource abundance worsens institutional quality and therefore a¤ects human development also through this negative institutional e¤ect. In other words, the e¤ect through inequality does not eliminate the e¤ect through inequality that has been identi…ed by Bulte et al. (2005) . The two e¤ects operate together and in the same direction: higher resource abundance results in lower human development.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Conclusion
The paper uses a simple theoretical framework to investigate the e¤ect of resource abundance on human development. The theory predicts that higher resource abundance worsens average human development through its e¤ect on the inequality of income distribution in the economy. This prediction is then empirically tested using a system of three equations. Estimates indicate that resource-rich countries do tend to experience higher inequality and that higher inequality reduces human development. This e¤ect via inequality adds to the e¤ect that natural resources have on human development through the quality of institutions. Therefore, the inequality channel and the institutional channel co-exist and operate in the same direction. However, estimates also suggest that a third channel of transmission is at work. An hypothesis to be tested in future work is that this third channel operates through the volatility of growth. In a nutshell, resource-rich economies would experience greater volatility because they are exposed to changes in international commodity prices. If volatility has asymmetric e¤ects; that is, if recession hurt the poor more than the rich and expansions bene…t the rich more than the poor, then higher volatility would reduce human development.
From a policymaking perspective, the results of this paper assign a critical role to redistribution in bu¤ering the adverse e¤ects of resource abundance on development prospect. Of course, redistribution is not meant to substitute for institutional reforms, which are desirable not just to avoid the resource curse, but also to promote growth and improve economic outcomes. However, tackling the inequalities associated with resource abundance will help transform the curse into a potential blessing.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
From equation (12) the derivative of _ h w.r.t. is:
From equation (13) the derivative of _ a w.r.t. is
To be mean-preserving, a chance in must be such that
Substituting (19) into (17) and rearranging terms:
In equation (20), is positive and 1 v. As shown in the text, @a W @ is negative and a P > a W . This latter inequality implies that the term in square brackets is positive, so that in the end
Proof of proposition 2
From equation (8) the derivative of a P w.r.t. is:
From equation (11) the derivatve of a W w.r.t. is:
where is use made of the fact that in equilibrium = L 1 Substituting (21) and (22) into both (17) and (18) 
The sign of both derivatives is uncertain and depends on the relative size of model parameters. Focusing on equation (23), the term 1 v is positive, so that the sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the expression in square brackets. While this expression cannot be signed unambiguously, an increase in a P and a contemporaneous decrease in a W (that is, a wider gap between a P and a W ) increase the likelihood that it is negative and therefore
First stage diagnostics
To be valid, instruments must be exogenous and relevant. The J-test reported at the bottom of tables 1 and 2 indicates that the overidentfying restrictions implied by the choice of instruments cannot be rejected, thus providing some evidence that the instruments are likely to be exogenous. To assess relevance, instead, various measures of goodness of …t of the …rst stage regression in the 2SLS procedure are reported in Table 3 . For each endogenous regressor, the table gives the R 2 , partial R 2 and associated F statistic, and the Shea (partial) R 2 . The traditional R 2 is not particularly informative in this context. More interesting are the other two R 2 ; which are computed by partialling out included instruments. In particular, the Shea's R 2 takes into account interrelations between excluded instruments when there are two or more endogenous variables. As can be seen from the table, the F-test associated with the partial R 2 always rejects the null hypothesis that the excluded instrument are not signi…cant in the …rst stage regression. At the same time, Shea R 2 is numerically very close to the partial R 2 . As discussed for instance in Baum et al. (2003) this suggests that the chosen instruments are e¤ectively relavant.
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List of variables and data sources
Human development: principal component of (i) life expectancy at birth, (ii) percentage of children ages 12-23 months who recieved vaccination against diphteria, pertussis, and tetanus, (iii) average number of years of schooling in the population. Source: life expectancy and immunization data are taken from the World Development Indicators, education data are from Barro and Lee (2001) and updates from ILo and UNESCO.
Inequality: Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution. Source: United Nations University -WIDER database.
Per-capita GDP: log or GDP per-capita in constant US dollars. Source: World Development Indicators Natural resources: the main reference variable is the log of subsoil assets per-individual in US dollars from World Bank (1997). The following other variables are used in some regressions: log of natural capital per-individual in US dollars (World Bank, 1997) , ratio of exports of fuels and metals to total merchandise exports (World Development Indicators), and log of per-capita rent from energy, minerals, and forestry (World Development Indicators)
Institutional quality: the main reference variable is 1 minus the ratio of currency in circulation to M2. This is constructed following the deifnition in Clague et al. (1999) and using data in the Internaitonal Financial Statistics of the IMF. For the sensitivity analysis, the index of quality of the legal environment provided by the Economic Freedom of the World is used.
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